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Article 50(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that
“Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own
constitutional requirements.”
It was therefore a requirement of EU law that the United Kingdom identify just what the “United Kingdom
constitution” required to constitute a decision to leave the EU.   The United Kingdom government’s position was
that it could simply rely upon the foreign aﬀairs prerogative to make such a decision and unilaterally begin the
process for the secession of the United Kingdom from the EU.   The Supreme Court, by an 8-3 majority,
disagreed.   In a single, though apparently multi-authored, opinion the majority (Lord Neuberger, Lady Hal, Lord
Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson and Lord Hodge) ruled (at para 122):
“The essential point is that, if, as we consider, what would otherwise be a prerogative act would
result in a change in domestic law, the act can only lawfully be carried out with the sanction of
primary legislation enacted by the Queen in Parliament.”
In three individually authored separate opinions Lords Reed, Carnwath and Hughes set out their reasons for
dissenting from this conclusion.   All three dissenters expressly agreed with the majority’s approach on the
devolution issues in the case and added no independent analysis to this.   The Supreme Court was, therefore,
unanimous in its treatment of the devolution arguments which had been aired before it, ﬁnding in favour of the
United Kingdom Government’s analysis (which was supported by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland) and
rejecting the positions taken by the Scottish and Welsh Governments, who had not taken an active part in the
proceedings before the (English) Divisional Court, but who were permitted to intervene on the appeal from the
Divisional Court to the Supreme Court.   The court held that nothing in any of the devolution statutes required
that the consent of any of the devolved legislatures be obtained before the relevant legislation is enacted by the
United Kingdom Parliament.   
This was a diﬃcult and highly politically sensitive case for the court.   But despite, or perhaps because of, their
unanimity on the devolution issues, the Supreme Court’s treatment of these matter is somewhat troubling.   The
devolution aspects of the United Kingdom constitution appear to have been seen by the court almost as an
unwelcome distraction from the main event.   Two cases from Northern Ireland (McCord and Agnew and others
were heard with the Miller appeal.  But counsel for the claimants in these Northern Ireland cases were permitted
only 30 minutes to share between them for oral submissions in the four days which the Supreme Court had
otherwise set aside allocated to hear oral argument from the litigants, interested parties and interveners who had
participated in the English Divisional Court proceedings.   The result is that none of the judgments from the court
– whether of the majority or in dissent – appeared to rise to the challenge of arguments for pluralism as essential
for the proper understanding of the constitutional law of the United Kingdom, understood as a State of Nations
with quite separate constitutional histories and as Union maintaining distinct constitutional traditions.    Instead,
at paragraph 41, the majority judgment simply refers to “seminal events” in the history of the relationship among
“the three principal organs of the state, the legislature (the two Houses of Parliament), the executive (ministers
and the government more generally) and the judiciary (the judges)” and notes that
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“a series of statutes enacted in the twenty years between 1688 and 1707 were of particular legal
importance. Those statutes were the Bill of Rights 1688/9 and the Act of Settlement 1701 in
England and Wales, the Claim of Right 1689 in Scotland, and the Acts of Union 1706 and 1707 in
England and Wales and in Scotland respectively. (Northern Ireland joined the United Kingdom
pursuant to the Acts of Union 1800 in Britain and Ireland). …  Parliamentary sovereignty is a
fundamental principle of the UK constitution, as was conclusively established in the statutes
referred to.”
It cannot be correct to say that “Parliamentary sovereignty” was established in these statutes, as if pre-Union
Scottish and English Parliaments could simply bootstrap themselves (or their successor, the post 1707 United
Kingdom Parliament) into sovereignty.  The Bill of Rights 1688/9 and the Scottish Claim of Right 1689 are
certainly predicated on the primacy of the pre-Union English Parliament and the pre-Union Scottish Parliament
over the English and Scottish Crowns respectively; but these two enactments are premised, if anything, on
claims of popular sovereignty in their claims to justify the deposition of the monarch.   In any event, the Supreme
Court presumes what, at the very least, should have been argued for – namely that the 1707 Union was no
revolutionary or foundational moment but that, instead, there was and is a constitutional continuity between pre-
Union institutions of government in England and those of the United Kingdom after the Union.   It assumes either
that the Scottish Crown and the Scottish Parliament prior to 1707 had the same attributes and stood in the same
relationship to one another as did the English Crown and English Parliament (which is historically debatable), or
that such diﬀerences from the English position as existed in Scotland were erased by the 1707 Union.   On this
latter view in 1707 Scotland was, from a constitutional perspective (like Wales had been before it), simply
subsumed into the realm and constitutional traditions of England.    There is some support for this view: in
Macgregor v Lord Advocate, 1921 SC 847 the Lord Ordinary (Lord Anderson) observed (at p 848) that “the
constitution of Scotland has been the same as that of England since 1707 [and] there is a presumption that the
same constitutional principles apply in both countries.”  But there is authority to the opposite eﬀect: in
MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 SC 39, for example, Lord President Cooper stated that “the principle of the
unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish
constitutional law.”   As a constitutional court for the United Kingdom tasked with ascertaining the constitutional
law of the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court should have at least adverted to these other constitutional
traditions within the polity and, for example, explained if and how Lord Steyn was wrong when in Jackson v.
Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262 at para 102 he referred to the “settlement contained in the Scotland Act
1998” as pointing to a “divided sovereignty” in these islands and observed that
“The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and
absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom.
Nevertheless, the supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution. It is a
construct of the common law. The judges created this principle. If that is so, it is not unthinkable
that circumstances could arise where the courts may have to qualify a principle established on a
diﬀerent hypothesis of constitutionalism.”
And just how was Lord Hope in error when he in stated in the same case at para 104 that
“Our [United Kingdom] constitution is dominated by the sovereignty of Parliament. But
Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute. It is not uncontrolled in the sense
referred to by Lord Birkenhead LC in McCawley v The King [1920] AC 691, 720. It is no longer
right to say that its freedom to legislate admits of no qualiﬁcation whatever. Step by step,
gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament
which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualiﬁed. … [T]he concept of a
Parliament that is absolutely sovereign is not entirely in accord with the reality.”
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If the treatment of the competing lines of Scottish referenced authority and tradition is under-developed, the
Supreme Court’s approach to the constitutional history of Northern Ireland would also have beneﬁtted from a
deeper analysis.   No acknowledgment is made of the divided and divisive legacy of the Glorious Revolution in
Ireland: celebrated, on the one hand, by Loyalist marchers proclaiming it a victory for Protestant liberties; bitterly
regretted by others as marking an end to James II and VII experiment in political toleration and equality of
treatment for his Catholic subjects.  And “Northern Ireland” did not join the United Kingdom pursuant to the Acts
of Union 1800, as Supreme Court would have it.   Instead, the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland was
created by the Acts of Union 1800 which were passed by the Westminster and Dublin Parliaments.     The
Proclamation of the Irish Republic which was read out from the steps of the Dublin General Post Oﬃce on Easter
Monday 1916 sought to repudiate this Union in the name of (Irish) popular sovereignty, declaring “the right of the
people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and
indefeasible”.  On 6 December 1921, following over ﬁve years of civil unrest and military conﬂict in Ireland, there
were signed in London by representatives of Great Britain on the one hand and of Ireland on the other (though
when and how Great Britain and Ireland had again become distinct entities in international law is not clear)
“Articles of an Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland”.    The Westminster (Imperial)
Parliament then enacted the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act 1922 and the Irish Free State Constitution Act
1922, giving this British-Irish Treaty, and the Irish Free State Constitution, the force of domestic law: see Moore
v. Attorney General for the Irish Free State [1935] AC 484, JCPC.   Clause 11 of the British-Irish Treaty gave the
Parliament of Northern Ireland (which had been brought into being as a devolved legislature by the Government
of Ireland Act 1920) one month from the date of these Acts coming into force to decide whether the territory of
Northern Ireland (“as determined in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible
with economic and geographic conditions”) should remain in, or opt out from, the Irish Free State.  Stormont duly
exercised this opt out.  So it was this decision, by a devolved Parliament sitting in Belfast, which created the
present United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.   This newly formed United Kingdom’s relationship
with the rest of Ireland remains as set out in the Ireland Act 1949 which, in Section 1(1) “recognized and
declared that the part of Ireland heretofore known as Eire ceased, as from 18 April 1949, to be part of His
Majesty’s dominions” but declared in Section 2(1) that “notwithstanding that the Republic of Ireland is not part of
His Majesty’s dominions, the Republic of Ireland is not a foreign country for the purposes of any law in force in
any part of the United Kingdom”.   
And even within the English constitutional tradition, Blackstone speaks of “civil liberty” and of popular rather than
Parliamentary sovereignty as foundations of the “British constitution” when discussing the constitutional
limitations it places on the prerogative powers of the “king of England” (sic).  He notes at the outset of  Chapter 7
“Of the King’s Prerogative” in Book 1 of his 1765-1769 Commentaries on the Laws of England that:
“one of the principal bulwarks of civil liberty, or (in other words) of the British constitution, was the
limitation of the king’s prerogative by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is impossible he
should ever exceed them, without the consent of the people, on the one hand; or without, on the
other, a violation of that original contract, which in all states impliedly, and in ours most expressly,
subsists between the prince and the subject.”
More recently yet, in Moohan v. Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67 [2015] 1 AC 901 Lord Hodge (in a majority
judgment with which Lord Neuberger, Baroness Hale  Lord Clarke  and, Lord Reed agreed) stated at §35:
“I do not exclude the possibility that in the very unlikely event that a parliamentary majority
abusively sought to entrench its power by a curtailment of the franchise or similar device, the
common law, informed by principles of democracy and the rule of law and international norms,
would be able to declare such legislation unlawful.”
None of this complex multi-national constitutional history – and the implications it might have for the theory and
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practice of sovereignty in the United Kingdom, whether Parliamentary or popular – appears to have been
considered by the Supreme Court in Miller.   Instead the Supreme Court’s reasoning proceeds on the
assumption that the 19th century English constitutional tradition as formulated/invented by Dicey – the mythistory
of England, as it may be termed – is the fount and only origin of the contemporary United Kingdom constitution. 
From the terms of the Supreme Court judgment, while the United Kingdom constitution may contain
presumptions (for example, that speciﬁc rather than general statutory words are needed for the United Kingdom
Parliament to override fundamental rights: para 87) it contains only two deﬁnite rules, namely that:
1. The United Kingdom Parliament has “the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever;
and further, no person or body is recognised by the law as having a right to override or set
aside the legislation of Parliament; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the
law of England (sic) as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament”:
para 43,  quoting and approving Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution (8th ed, 1915), page 38
2. “Proceedings in [the pre-1707 Union English] Parliament ought not to be impeached or
questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament” (para 145, citing Article 9 of the English
Bill of Rights 1688/89.
On this reading of the principle of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, the court’s dismissal of the
arguments raised by the Northern Ireland claimants and by the Scottish and Welsh Governments about the
need to involve the peoples, legislatures and governments of all parts of the Union in any decision for the UK to
leave the EU, is easy and inevitable, yet unconvincing and unsatisfying.   The majority states (at para 129) that
“When enacting the EU constraints in the NI Act and the other devolution Acts, [the Westminster]
Parliament proceeded on the assumption that the United Kingdom would be a member of the
European Union. That assumption is consistent with the view that [the Westminster] Parliament
would determine whether the United Kingdom would remain a member of the European Union.”
Yet, surely, it is equally consistent with the view that the Parliaments of the United Kingdom should properly
determine whether the United Kingdom would remain a member of the European Union ?  The majority
judgement continues (at paras 129-30):
“Within the United Kingdom, relations with the European Union, like other matters of foreign
aﬀairs, are reserved or excepted in the cases of Scotland and Northern Ireland, and are not
devolved in the case of Wales …. Accordingly, the devolved legislatures do not have a parallel
legislative competence in relation to withdrawal from the European Union.”
But no-one was arguing that the devolved legislatures had competence to pass their own legislation in the
sphere of international relations or foreign aﬀairs.  The issue was whether the devolved legislatures (whose
electorates encompass EU citizens from other Member States settled here) together with the United Kingdom
Parliament had the right, as a matter of United Kingdom constitutional law and principle , to be involved in the
decision that the United Kingdom leave the European Union.   And while accepting (at para 130) that “the
removal of the EU constraints on withdrawal from the EU Treaties will alter the competence of the devolved
institutions unless new legislative constraints are introduced”, the majority summarily dismissed, as inconsistent
with its understanding of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, the Scottish and Welsh
Governments’ arguments that the statutory requirement for the United Kingdom Parliament to seek the consent
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of the devolved legislatures when legislating with regard to devolved matter could ever be legally enforceable, let
alone with regard to any legislation concerning the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.
The paradox of such a doctrine of untrammelled sovereignty is that the Westminster Parliament has no
Kompetenz-Kompetenz – it cannot bind its successors.    How then to account for those statutory provisions
which appear to do just that ?  Examples of statutory provisions which look, on their face, to be creating new
constitutional rules which future United Kingdom Parliaments are legally obliged to respect within the context of
a devolved United Kingdom are:
Section 63A(1) of the Scotland Act 1998 (SA) which states that
“The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are a permanent part of the United
Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements”.
Section 63A(3) SA which states that
“it is declared that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are not to be abolished
except on the basis of a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum.”
Section 1(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (NIA) which provides
“It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and
shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting
in a poll
Section 28(8) SA which provides that
“But it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with
regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.”
Clauses 1 and 2 of the Wales Bill 2016-2017, which at the time of writing was still before the United Kingdom
Parliament, contains substantially identical provisions as Sections 28(8) SA and 63A SA.  These clauses speak
of the National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Government “as a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s
constitutional arrangements …. not to be abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of Wales
voting in a referendum”  and also conﬁrm that that “the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally
legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the [Welsh] Assembly”.
These references to the permanence of the devolved institutions and to the United Kingdom Parliament being
unable to abolish them without the consent of the relevant demos – whether “ the people of Scotland “, “a
majority of the people of Northern Ireland” or “the people of Wales” –  expressed through a referendum, rather
looks like a recognition with the United Kingdom constitution of popular sovereignty, at least within the Celtic
fringe.  Yet the Advocate-General for Scotland, who presented argument on the devolution aspects in Miller on
behalf of the United Kingdom government, dismissed these statutory provisions as no more than “self-denying
ordinances” which did not token any binding of future United Kingdom Parliaments.   On the Supreme Court’s
analysis, however, they are not even that.  Relying on past case law concerning constitutional conventions which
have not been given the force of law the majority states (at 144) that “It is well established that the courts of law
cannot enforce a political convention” and declares (at 146) that “judges therefore are neither the parents nor the
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guardians of political conventions; they are merely observers.”   It makes no diﬀerence to the court that, in the
devolution context, conventions have been written into statute.   This is described by the majority (at para 144) to
constitute no more than “legislative recognition” of a “political convention” which  “operates as a political
restriction on the activity of the UK Parliament”.   This is completely circular, however.  Because the only hard
and fast rule of the United Kingdom constitution which the Supreme Court is prepared to recognise is that the
United Kingdom Parliament cannot bind its successors, when the United Kingdom Parliament says it is binding
its successors and is laying down future binding constitutional rules in the plain language of the devolution
statutes, the Supreme Court says it is not.
So we have another paradox, or perhaps simply another logical incoherence, that in defence of its constitutional
vision of the untrammelled sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, the Supreme Court claims a right
eﬀectively to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament by “reading down” clear statutory provisions so
that they are said not to be constitutive of binding legal rules, but simply expressions legally unenforceable
political aspirations. Having so downgraded the statutory provisions the majority then piously concludes (at para
151) that the policing of its scope and the manner of operation of political convention “does not lie within the
constitutional remit of the judiciary, which is to protect the rule of law.”   On the Supreme Court’s analysis the
United Kingdom’s constitution exists in a perpetual present.  It has no past, and no future.   Ultimately the United
Kingdom constitution can, for the Supreme Court, be nothing more than a description of whatever United
Kingdom Parliament feels like doing or permitting – the United Kingdom Government feels it can get away with –
on any particular day.
Miller was essentially a case which was argued before, and decided by, the court on the basis of the English
Imperial constitutional tradition forged in the Victorian age.   In retrospect it might have been better for the
Scottish and Welsh Governments not to have intervened in the Miller appeal, and for the McCord and Agnew
reference not to have been heard with Miller.  This would have allowed the Miller case to have been decided (as
it had been before the (English) Divisional Court) on the proper basis of solely English constitutional tradition and
history.      In the Scottish constitutional tradition, previous case law is said to be binding not, as in English law,
by reason of its authority, but because of the authority of its reasoning.  Miller on devolution does not stand up to
scrutiny on this standard.   But, on the devolution aspects, it is a unanimous 11 judge decision of the highest
court in the land.  Unless the Supreme Court is going to make more of a habit of sitting in plenary session en
banc, its decision in Miller constitutes the ﬁnal and binding word on these matters.   By closing oﬀ the possibility
of, even the threat of, recourse to the courts as a means of resolving constitutional disputes between the
devolved nations and the United Kingdom Parliament or Government, the judgment will, if anything, exacerbate
political tensions between them.  This judgment has made the political constitution of the devolved United
Kingdom as a whole more unstable, more brittle, more fragile and more likely to break-up precisely because it
denies the devolved nations’ institutions any legal right to participate in the Brexit process.   
The immediate political result of the Supreme Court’s judgment on what it considered to be the main issue (of the
necessity for Westminster legislation to trigger Brexit) has been the publication by the United Kingdom
Government, and its introduction before the United Kingdom Parliament, of The European Union (Notiﬁcation of
Withdrawal) Bill.   This, in the terminology of German constitutional law, is an Ermächtigungsgestez or an
“Enabling Act”.  It consists of just one substantive sub-clause.   This sub-clause provides for the United Kingdom
Parliament to introduce into the United Kingdom constitution a new “leader principle” (the Germans always have
a word for it) as follows:
“The Prime Minister may notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United
Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU.”
Thus does legal constitutionalism end – not with a bang, but a whimper.     
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